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RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION, RELIGIOUS TRADITION, 
AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION 
by 
Marc O. DeGirolami* 
A religious accommodation is an exemption from compliance with the 
law for some but not for others. One might therefore suppose that before 
granting an accommodation, courts would inquire about whether a legal 
interference with religious belief or practice is truly significant, if only to 
evaluate whether the risk of political polarization that attends accommo-
dation is worth hazarding. But that is not the case: any assessment of the 
significance of a religious belief or practice within a claimant’s belief sys-
tem is strictly forbidden. 
Two arguments are pressed in support of this view: (1) courts have insti-
tutional reasons for acquiescing on the burden question; and (2) courts 
have anti-establishment reasons for doing so. Courts, it is said, do not 
decide about the quality of religious burdens. Claimants do that. Courts 
defer so as to reduce the political polarization that might result if some 
should perceive that their religious beliefs and practices are comparatively 
powerless to obtain exemptions. Deference on the burden question pre-
serves the religious neutrality of courts and mitigates the politically polar-
izing dangers of accommodation.  
This Essay contests that view. It argues that this approach to religious 
accommodation has generated considerable difficulties of its own that 
have aggravated the political polarization they were intended to reduce. 
Political polarization is now a pervasive feature of religious accommoda-
tion, but this Essay focuses on only some explanations for this unfortu-
nate state of affairs—those that relate to the antagonistic relationship be-
tween religious accommodation and established religious groups and 
traditions.  
First, hyper-deference as to the burden on religion systematically under-
mines the view that religions are institutional phenomena with estab-
lished, stable, and longstanding traditions. In doing so, it damages the 
 
*
Professor of Law and Associate Academic Dean, St. John’s University School of 
Law. Thanks to Nathan Chapman, Haider Ala Hamoudi, John Inazu, Michael 
Moreland, Mark Movsesian, Jim Oleske, Ronald Krotoszynski, Mark Tushnet, and 
Kevin Walsh. Earlier drafts of this Paper benefited from presentations at Notre Dame 
Law School and St. John’s University School of Law. 
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argument that courts are institutionally incompetent to evaluate reli-
gious ideas. Claims about the institutional incompetence of the judiciary 
to inquire into religious burdens proceed on the assumption that there is 
something unique—and intelligibly unique—about religious beliefs and 
practices that make them different from, say, individual foibles, fraudu-
lent schemes, flights of fancy, or private predilections. Arguments about 
the judiciary’s institutional incompetence as to religious questions con-
template the existence of other institutions that are competent as to those 
questions. Lacking such other institutions, the institutional competence 
of courts to evaluate religious claims is greatly strengthened. Courts are 
perfectly competent to evaluate fraud, idiosyncrasy, gibberish, and per-
sonal preference. Yet when courts are disabled from evaluating some va-
rieties of idiosyncratic eccentricity (denominated “religious”) but not oth-
ers (not so denominated), then “religion,” and therefore religious 
accommodation, is bound to be politically polarizing. The category of re-
ligion, having been stripped of its institutional character for legal pur-
poses, designates nothing coherent at all. And people begin to suspect 
with some justice that decisions about accommodation are being made on 
the basis of other reasons altogether.  
Second, the hyper-deferential approach to religious accommodation as-
sumes and promotes a particular and decidedly non-neutral view of reli-
gion as irrational and utterly incomprehensible to anybody other than an 
individual believer. Accommodation is not for established religious 
groups or traditions—groups that are organized, enduring, and that 
might offer substantial resistance to prevailing political and cultural or-
thodoxies. Accommodation is for the exotic, the personal, the unthreaten-
ing, and the peculiar. That view is part of the heritage of the highly in-
dividualized, subjective approach to religion steadily constitutionalized 
by the Supreme Court since the mid-twentieth century, and that now 
seems to be the foundation of one powerful strain of the contemporary 
cultural understanding of religion in America. It is a view whose promo-
tion in law has profoundly entangled the state with religion. The refusal 
of courts to make any serious inquiry into the nature of the asserted reli-
gious burden has encouraged increasingly aggressive, self-indulgent, and 
ephemeral assertions of religious freedom. It will—and indeed, it already 
has—promoted unserious religion. Small wonder that religion as a legal 
category is in such disreputable odor. Small wonder that religious ac-
commodation is increasingly perceived in politically partisan terms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States has inherited a long legal and political tradition of 
accommodating people from laws that impose burdens on religion. At 
some points, that tradition has enjoyed federal constitutional status.
1
 At 
present, it does not.
2
 Religious accommodation is instead generally re-
quired (when it is required) either by sundry federal and state statutes or 
by state constitutional law.
3
 And in still other cases, religious accommoda-
tion has simply been seen as a beneficently tolerant policy or the wisest 
practical course under the particular circumstances of religious pluralism 
in this country. 
Yet in all cases of religious accommodation, the threshold question 
concerns the nature of the imposition on religious exercise. That is be-
cause in the absence of countervailing factors, the law should apply with 
equal force and to everybody.
4
 When it applies selectively, the law’s au-
thority is compromised in at least two ways. First, the law’s unequal appli-
cation gives rise to the perception that the people who have to obey the 
law occupy a less favored position than the people who do not. That per-
ceived unfairness in the law may damage its authority. Second, the law’s 
own moral and political message may be diluted or perhaps even cheap-
ened inasmuch as its authority extends only as far as the non-
accommodated. Both of these consequences relate to the partiality of re-
ligious accommodation. Both can contribute to the perception that reli-
gious accommodation is one of the spoils of political influence. Both can 
therefore lead to political polarization, which here refers broadly to the 
increasing sense that decisions about religious accommodation depend 
on the perceived political, cultural, or ideological leanings of those re-
questing them. 
One might in consequence expect that, before granting a religious 
accommodation, it would logically and rather obviously be necessary to 
inquire about precisely how the law interferes with a claimant’s system of 
religious belief and practice. That interference ought to be ample indeed 
to hazard the risk of political polarization that attends accommodation; 
 
1
E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963). 
2
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
3
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012), 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc 
(2012), the sundry state RFRAs, and state constitutional law. In general, references to 
“RFRA” in this Essay are to the 1993 federal act rather than to any state law patterned, 
in whole or in part, after the federal act.  
4
I view accommodations as exceptions from the law rather than a part of the law 
itself, recognizing that some may contest that description and believe that 
accommodations are themselves part of the law. At any rate, if the law applies with 
full force to some and only partial (or no) force to others, it does not apply equally to 
everyone. 
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claimants ought to be able clearly to show and explain the interference. 
And yet one of the most vexed issues in the law of religious accommoda-
tion concerns not merely the nature of a “substantial burden” on reli-
gious exercise but even the propriety of any legal inquiry about religious 
burdens at all. Any assessment of the importance or centrality of a reli-
gious belief or practice within the claimant’s belief system is strictly for-
bidden: 
It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the “centrality” of 
religious beliefs before applying a “compelling interest” test in the 
free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine the “im-
portance” of ideas before applying the “compelling interest” test in 
the free speech field. What principle of law or logic can be brought 
to bear to contradict a believer’s assertion that a particular act is 
“central” to his personal faith? . . . Repeatedly and in many different 
contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to deter-
mine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility 
of a religious claim.
5
 
Two arguments are generally pressed in support of this view, both of 
which reflect courts’ interests in maintaining neutrality as to religion, or 
at least its veneer: 
• Courts have “institutional” reasons for acquiescing in religious 
claimants’ understandings of the nature of a law’s burden; 
• Courts have anti-establishment reasons for doing so. 
The two arguments are connected inasmuch as the more deeply a court 
burrows into the quality of the imposition, the more probably it will 
breach epistemological substrata out of its depth, and the less likely that 
it can avoid entangling itself with religious affairs. Courts, it is said, do 
not decide about the quality of religious burdens; they do not opine on 
religious questions at all. Claimants do that. Both arguments thus serve 
the function of deflecting suspicion that decisions about religious ac-
commodation are ultimately non-neutral or a matter of political influ-
ence or preference. 
Courts, in sum, defer on the question of the burden. They defer to 
the individual claimant. They defer at least in part to reduce the political 
polarization that might result if some groups or individuals—particularly 
religious minorities or members thereof—should perceive that their reli-
gious beliefs and practices are comparatively powerless to obtain exemp-
tions.
6
 Deference on the burden question has been the preferred strategy 
to preserve the neutrality of courts when it comes to religion and to miti-
gate the politically polarizing dangers of religious accommodation. Def-
erence reconciles religious accommodation and religious pluralism. 
 
5
Smith, 494 U.S. at 886–87. 
6
See infra Part I. 
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This Essay will contest that view. It will argue that this approach to re-
ligious accommodation has generated considerable difficulties of its own 
that unfortunately have aggravated the political polarization they were 
intended to reduce. For a variety of reasons, political polarization is now 
a pervasive feature of religious accommodation. This Essay focuses on on-
ly some of those reasons—those that relate to the antagonistic relation-
ship between religious accommodation (and specifically the hyper-
deference accorded to claimants on the burden question) and estab-
lished religious groups and traditions. 
First, hyper-deference as to the burden on religion systematically 
undermines the view that religions are institutional phenomena with es-
tablished, stable, and longstanding traditions. In doing so, it damages the 
argument that courts are institutionally incompetent to evaluate religious 
ideas. Claims about the institutional incompetence of the judiciary to in-
quire into religious burdens proceed on the assumption that there is 
something unique—and intelligibly unique—about religious beliefs and 
practices that make them different from, say, individual foibles, fraudu-
lent schemes, flights of fancy, or private predilections. Arguments about 
the judiciary’s institutional incompetence as to religious questions con-
template the existence of other institutions that are competent as to those 
questions. Lacking such other institutions, the institutional competence 
of courts to evaluate religious claims is greatly strengthened. Courts are 
perfectly competent to evaluate fraud, idiosyncrasy, gibberish, and per-
sonal preference. Yet when courts are disabled from evaluating some va-
rieties of idiosyncratic eccentricity (denominated “religious”) but not 
others (not so denominated), then “religion,” and therefore religious ac-
commodation, is bound to be politically polarizing. The category of reli-
gion, having been stripped of its institutional character for legal purpos-
es, designates nothing uniform at all. And people begin to suspect with 
some justice that decisions about whether to accommodate or not are be-
ing made on the basis of other, unstated reasons altogether. 
Second, the hyper-deferential approach to religious accommodation 
assumes and promotes a particular and decidedly non-neutral view of re-
ligion as irrational and utterly incomprehensible to anybody other than 
an individual believer. Accommodation is not for established religious 
groups or traditions—groups that are organized, enduring, and that 
might offer substantial resistance to prevailing political and cultural or-
thodoxies. Accommodation is for the exotic, the personal, the peculiar, 
and (especially) the unthreatening. That view is part of the heritage of 
the highly individualized, subjective approach to religion
7
 that was given 
 
7
Marc O. DeGirolami, Virtue, Freedom, and the First Amendment, 91 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 1465, 1504 (2016). 
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perhaps its most eloquent exposition in the writing of William James,
8
 
was subsequently constitutionalized in mid-twentieth-century Supreme 
Court case law,
9
 and now seems to be the foundation of at least one pow-
erful strain of the contemporary cultural understanding of religion in 
America.
10
 It is reflected in what my colleague, Mark Movsesian, has de-
scribed as the “rise of the Nones”
11
 and what Ross Douthat has character-
ized more polemically as “Bad Religion.”
12
 It is a view whose promotion in 
law has profoundly entangled the state with religion inasmuch as it has 
contributed to one prominent and currently fashionable understanding 
of religion’s nature or essence. The refusal of courts to make any serious 
inquiry into the nature of the asserted religious burden has encouraged 
increasingly bizarre, aggressive, self-indulgent, ephemeral, and scatter-
shot assertions of religious freedom. It will—and, indeed, it already has—
promoted unserious religion. Small wonder that religion as a legal cate-
gory is in such disreputable odor.
13
 Small wonder that religious accom-
modation is increasingly perceived in politically partisan terms. 
This Essay argues that the two most common justifications for defer-
ence—institutional incompetence and excessive religious entangle-
ment—are subverted when a court categorically refuses to inquire about 
the nature of the burden on religious exercise. Much of the recent aca-
demic skepticism concerning religious accommodation has come from 
those who are either indifferent or hostile to religion as a category merit-
ing special legal protection. Yet, increasingly, criticism of religious ac-
commodation—and, indeed, of an overreliance by religious people on 
arguments for religious accommodation—has come from those who are 
sympathetic to religion or are perhaps even religious believers them-
selves. The Essay concludes by exploring some of those arguments, in 
which skepticism about religious accommodation—and in particular the 
increasing sense that accommodation is reserved for individualistic, bal-
kanized, politically and culturally unthreatening religion that is dissociat-
ed from any enduring tradition or community—has been aggravated by 
 
8
William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human 
Nature 166 (University Books, Inc. 1963) (1902) (discussion of the “twice-born”). 
9
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718–19 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398, 410 (1963). 
10
See infra Part III. 
11
Mark L. Movsesian, Defining Religion in American Law: Psychic Sophie and the Rise 
of the Nones 1 (Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Stud., EUI Working Paper No. 
RSCAS 2014/19, 2014). 
12
Ross Douthat, Bad Religion: How We Became a Nation of Heretics 3 
(2012). 
13
There are multiple causes for religion’s increasingly problematic status as a 
special legally protected category, of course. This Essay focuses only on a small group 
of those causes, without in any way denying that others exist. 
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courts’ total evaluative detachment on the question of the religious bur-
den. 
I. DEFERENCE ON THE BURDEN QUESTION 
If a legal regime provides no accommodations for religion, it need 
not be overly concerned with whether its laws have the incidental effect 
of burdening religion. But regimes that are open to accommodating reli-
gion invariably need to know something about the burden imposed by 
their laws. Legislators, administrators, and judges must then inquire 
about the quality of the burden and evaluate the justification for accom-
modation against other social interests. At the very least, as Kent 
Greenawalt has argued, the alleged burden must be “nontrivial.”
14
 But 
several contemporary formulations appear to require a good deal more 
in providing that the burden must be “substantial.”
15
 The Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act is fairly representative: “Government shall not sub-
stantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results 
from a rule of general applicability,” with exceptions for laws that serve 
compelling government interests that are achieved by the “least restric-
tive means.”
16
 The term “substantial” is rarely defined with any precision 
statutorily or in case law,
17
 and yet a rapid glance at any dictionary plainly 
suggests that the burden on religion must somehow be important, essen-
tial, or considerable.
18
 
 
14
1 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise and 
Fairness 202 (2006). 
15
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b) (2012); 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000cc(a)(1) (2012). As Angela Carmella has noted, several state constitutions have 
been interpreted to require claimants to show a “substantial burden” on their 
religious beliefs or practices. Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protections of 
Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 275, 275–76 
(1993). Not all states that protect religious freedom through religious 
accommodation require a “substantial” burden. See, for example, Missouri and 
Rhode Island’s RFRAs, which provide that a law may not “restrict” religious exercise. 
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 1.302 (West 2013); R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80.1 (2006). New Mexico 
and Texas statutes speak of an “act or refusal to act” that is “motivated” by a “sincere 
religious belief . . . .” New Mexico adds the requirement that the motivation be 
“substantia[l].” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-22-2 (2013); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 
§ 110.001 (West 2011). Connecticut uses the language of “burden” in its state RFRA 
without “substantial.” Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571b (West 2013). 
16
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b). 
17
Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 
1175, 1213 (1996) (“Neither the text nor the legislative history of RFRA provides any 
clear indication of how courts ought to determine whether an incidental burden on 
religion is in fact substantial.”). A few lower court formulations are considered infra.  
18
See, e.g., 17 The Oxford English Dictionary 66–67 (2d ed. 1989) 
(substantial is synonymous with “ample” or “considerable”). There are other ways to 
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Notwithstanding this seemingly high threshold, however, judicial in-
quiries into the importance or status of the religious exercise being bur-
dened are absolutely forbidden.
19
 The Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act follows the spirit of the Smith decision in stating 
that “religious exercise” includes “any exercise of religion, whether or 
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”
20
 It is an 
oddity of the statutory language (and perhaps even a suggestion of inter-
nal incoherence), however, that the assumption even in this statute, 
which purports to disavow inquiries about centrality, seems to be that the 
claimant should not come to court at all without a “system of religious be-
lief,” a component of which has been burdened.
21
 
Likewise, after the Supreme Court fundamentally altered the frame-
work for accommodation claims in 1963 to require an assessment of a 
law’s “substantial burden” on religious exercise, questions quickly arose 
about exactly what a court should consider.
22
 Almost no criterion has 
been thought sufficiently hands-off or deferential.
23
 Requirements of a 
religious system of beliefs, internal consistency, and even rough align-
ment of beliefs with others within the religious community or group of 
which the claimant says he is a member all have been held out of order.
24
 
Courts have repeatedly held that an individual’s beliefs need not corre-
spond at all with—indeed, may run directly contrary to—the beliefs of 
the religious group, community, or tradition with which the individual 
claims to be associated.
25
 True, the Court has also suggested in dicta 
(usually buried deep in footnotes) that extreme or “bizarre” deviations 
from the beliefs and practices of the claimant’s alleged religious commu-
nity might be problematic.
26
 But these little asides have never posed any 
real obstacle. The standard by which religiousness is measured is the in-
dividual believer alone.
27
 
 
interpret “substantial”—as relating to substance, for example, or as being real or true 
rather than illusory—but these interpretations seem rather peculiar in this context. 
19
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990). 
20
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A). 
21
For further discussion, see infra Part II. 
22
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–06 (1963). 
23
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
24
E.g., id. at 716. 
25
See, e.g., id. (“[I]t is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to 
inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the 
commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural 
interpretation.”); Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 320–21 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasizing 
autonomy interests in religious self-identification notwithstanding a religious 
community’s judgment to the contrary). 
26
Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 n.2 (1989); Thomas, 450 
U.S. at 715. 
27
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715–16; Jackson, 196 F.3d at 320–21. 
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One comparatively uncontroversial premise has been that the claim-
ant should at least be “sincere.” Whether the issue is drug use, withdrawal 
of children from school, conscientious objection to military service (on 
religious grounds or otherwise) or to other government-imposed man-
dates, or others, in order to satisfy the requirement of substantial burden, 
the claimant must, at a minimum, be telling the truth about his beliefs. 
Excepting cases of incontestable and practically self-confessed fraud,
28
 
however, courts and administrators have shown great reluctance to in-
quire into the authenticity of a claimant’s sincerity.
29
 The claimant’s say-
so both about what he believes and how important his beliefs may be are 
generally sufficient, for the state is not in any position to question the au-
thenticity of what he says he believes. If sincerity is all that is left of the 
substantial burden inquiry, not much actually remains. 
Even that may be disappearing. Some scholars have criticized inquir-
ies into sincerity as altogether misguided.
30
 It is said that evaluations of 
sincerity interfere with highly personal and perpetually shifting interests 
in self-definition.
31
 Professor Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, for example, tells 
the story of a prison administrator charged with determining whether a 
prisoner who desired a Seder dinner was authentically Jewish.
32
 Though 
the administrator believed the prisoner was lying about his religious 
commitments, he allowed the dinner because religiosity implicates mat-
ters of murky or evanescent personal identity.
33
 Professor Mark Tushnet 
likewise is skeptical about “the capacity of institutional decision makers, 
such as arbitrators or administrators of public benefits programs, to de-
termine sincerity.”
34
 “[T]he government rarely contests sincerity[,]” 
writes Professor Fred Gedicks, “and courts rarely adjudicate it.”
35
 For 
these scholars, even sincerity about religion either eludes judicial evalua-
tion or is essentially meaningless. 
 
28
Parodies meant to mock existing legal or political arrangements also seem not 
to qualify as sincere, as Nathan Chapman argues in a fine draft article, Adjudicating 
Religious Sincerity (on file with author). 
29
See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1508–09 (D. Wyo. 1995) 
(holding that the “Church of Marijuana” was not a bona fide religion, but refraining 
from stating that the individual claimant was lying). This pattern of reticence can be 
traced to United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87–88 (1944), in which the Court held 
that juries ought neither to determine questions of falsity nor sincerity as to religious 
beliefs because those two are bound up together. 
30
Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May (and Why They 
Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming Jan. 
2017) (manuscript at 7), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657733. 
31
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 441, 453 (1998). 
32
Id. 
33
Id. 
34
Mark Tushnet, Accommodation of Religion Thirty Years On, 38 Harv. J. L. & 
Gender 1, 10 (2015). 
35
Gedicks, supra note 30 (manuscript at 7). 
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Notwithstanding what appears a generous test, religious claimants of-
ten have lost under it in court, but the reasons far more frequently in-
volve solicitude for government interests that clash with a substantial 
burden than with skepticism about the claimant’s assertion of a substan-
tial burden.
36
 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that an asserted bur-
den on religion did not rise to the requisite level of substantiality in only 
two cases about religious accommodation—Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. 
California Board of Equalization
37
 and Bowen v. Roy.
38
 In Swaggart, the Court 
ruled unanimously that a generally applicable sales and use tax did not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause when it was applied to the sale of reli-
gious literature because “[t]here is no evidence in this case that collec-
tion and payment of the tax violates appellant’s sincere religious be-
liefs.”
39
 Having less money to spend on religious activities than would 
have been the case without the sales tax was not a “constitutionally signif-
icant” burden.
40
 
In Bowen, a majority of the Court concluded that the government 
could use internally and for its own purposes the Social Security number 
assigned to the daughter of Native American parents, notwithstanding 
the parents’ claim that use of the number would “rob the spirit” of their 
daughter.
41
 But a majority also believed that the parents should not have 
to supply the number.
42
 The Court’s assumption seems to have been that 
the objection to the number was sufficiently religiously powerful or im-
portant to exempt the claimants from this sort of compliance. 
In another case not involving religious accommodation, Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, the Court found that the 
federal government’s plan to build a road straight through a Native 
American burial ground did not impose a substantial burden on Native 
American religious exercise because the law had “no tendency to coerce 
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs . . . .”
43
 Even 
though the Court admitted that the road might “virtually destroy the . . . 
Indians’ ability to practice their religion,”
44
 this was of no moment be-
 
36
See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1982); see also 
Greenawalt, supra note 14, at 214 (“[T]he compelling interest test in [religious] 
exemption cases has never been quite what it seems.”). 
37
493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990). 
38
476 U.S. 693, 712 (1986). 
39
Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 391. 
40
Id. 
41
Bowen, 476 U.S. at 696, 701. 
42
Id. at 714–15 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part); id. at 728 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part). 
43
485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988). 
44
Id. at 451–52 (quoting Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 795 
F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 1986)) (alteration in original). 
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cause the road did not compel the Native Americans to do anything, or 
not to do anything, in violation of their religious commitments.
45
 
The Court’s substantial burden jurisprudence has, in sum, been ex-
tremely meager. It has found the standard satisfied in virtually every oth-
er religious accommodation case.
46
 Indeed, its standard practice is essen-
tially to assume that a belief about the nature of the burden is sincere 
and “move on to the next steps of the analysis.”
47
 Likewise, though feder-
al appellate courts are slightly more likely than the Supreme Court to 
find the substantial burden requirement unsatisfied, they too, generally 
defer. Setting aside the colossal and complicated ACA contraception 
mandate litigation (of which more below), over the past five years these 
courts have found the substantial burden inquiry satisfied at a rate of 
more than two to one.
48
 Yet in the ongoing nonprofit contraception 
 
45
For criticism, see Marc O. DeGirolami, The Tragedy of Religious Freedom 
168–71 (2013). 
46
In United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982), the Court held against an 
Amish farm and carpentry shop’s religious objection to paying Social Security taxes, 
but the Court actually found that the requirement imposed a substantial burden on 
religion. 
47
Tushnet, supra note 34, at 10 n.59 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014)) (“Arrogating the authority to provide a binding 
national answer to this religious and philosophical question, HHS . . . in effect tell[s] 
the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed. For good reason, we have repeatedly 
refused to take such a step.”). 
48
From 2011 to 2015, the federal appellate courts found the substantial burden 
requirement satisfied in reported cases including: Knight v. Thompson, 797 F.3d 934, 
944 (11th Cir. 2015) (substantial burden was stipulated); Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 
169, 180 (4th Cir. 2015); Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1135 (9th
 
Cir. 2015); 
Schlemm, 784 F.3d at 365 (finding genuine issue of material fact as to burden); Davila 
v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198, 1204 (11th Cir. 2015); Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 
566–67 (6th Cir. 2014); Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 2014); Native 
American Council of Tribes v. Weber, 750 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2014); Wall v. 
Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 499 (4th Cir. 2014) (substantial burden was stipulated); 
Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 57 (10th Cir. 2014); Chance v. Tex. Dep’t of 
Criminal Justice, 730 F.3d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 2013); (substantial burden was 
stipulated); Garner v. Kennedy, 713 F.3d 237, 244 (5th Cir. 2013); Bethel World 
Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cty. Council, 706 F.3d 548, 559 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(finding genuine issue of material fact as to burden); Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of 
Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 795 (5th Cir. 2012); Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 
694 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Ali, 682 F.3d 705, 711 (8th Cir. 
2012); Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 200 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lafley, 656 
F.3d 936, 940 (9th Cir. 2011) (assuming substantial burden); Maddox v. Love, 655 
F.3d 709, 720 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding genuine issue of material fact as to burden); 
United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1284 (10th Cir. 2011); Int’l Church of the 
Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(finding genuine issue of material fact as to burden). Those that find it unsatisfied 
include: Andon, LLC v. City of Newport News, 813 F.3d 510, 512 (4th Cir. 2016); 
Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2015); Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 
105, 107 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that “In God We Trust” on the currency did not 
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mandate litigation, nearly every Court of Appeals to address the issue has 
held that the claimants were not substantially burdened
49
—a remarkable 
volte-face, in light of the purportedly hyper-deferential inquiry, that is dif-
ficult to explain without resorting to factors quite extraneous to legal 
doctrine and yet eminently germane to the political polarization of reli-
gious accommodation.
50
 
There are two principal arguments for deference as to the nature of 
the burden, both of which are meant to address, at least in part, the 
problem of religious accommodation’s association with political polariza-
tion. First, courts simply are not competent institutions to evaluate reli-
gious beliefs and practices. As the Supreme Court put it in United States v. 
Lee and Thomas v. Review Board: “It is not within ‘the judicial function and 
judicial competence,’ however, to determine whether appellee or the 
Government has the proper interpretation of the Amish faith; ‘[c]ourts 
are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.’”
51
 The argument from in-
competence suggests precisely that courts are poor judges of what reli-
gion may require. The focus is on the proper function or role of courts: 
religion is the sort of thing that the judiciary, as an institution, is not well 
suited to understand. Courts are not skilled in such matters: they “lack 
the tools to engage in line drawing when it comes to determining and 
calibrating the degree of theological impact a particular law imposes on 
religion.”
52
 Removing courts from the sphere of competence as to reli-
gion is thought to have the effect of shielding them from making judg-
ments about religious affairs and, in this sense, preserving their neutrality 
as to religion. 
 
substantially burden atheists’ beliefs); Mutawakkil v. Huibregtse, 735 F.3d 524, 528 
(7th Cir. 2013); Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 
78, 100 (1st Cir. 2013); Hartmann v. Ca. Dep’t of Corr., 707 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 
2013); Ruiz-Diaz v. United States, 703 F.3d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 2012); McFaul v. 
Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 577 (5th Cir. 2012); Mahoney v Doe, 642 F.3d 1112, 1121–
22 (D.C. Cir. 2011); DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 153 (5th Cir. 2011). 
49
See, e.g., Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1129 (11th Cir. 2016); Grace Sch. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 
788, 791 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2011 (2016); Little Sisters of the Poor 
Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1160 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. 
Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016); Mich. Catholic Conference v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738, 746 (6th 
Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2450 (2016); Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 
F.3d 207, 210 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2450 (2016); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. 
Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Univ. of 
Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 618 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 
(2016); Geneva Coll. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 427 (3d 
Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Priests for Life v. U.S. Dept. of Health & 
Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 F.3d 1557 (2016). 
50
For further discussion, see Part IV infra. 
51
Lee, 455 U.S. at 257 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)). 
52
Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial Burdens 18 (Pepperdine Univ. Sch. 
Law, Paper No. 2016/3, 2016). 
20_4_DeGirolami_Article_2 (Do Not Delete) 1/23/2017  1:47 PM 
2017] RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION 1139 
Second, courts ought to defer to a claimant’s understanding of the 
burden’s quality not merely because they are poor judges of religion or 
because they are likely to make mistakes, but because even if they were 
good judges of religion they would risk excessively entangling church 
and state with too searching an inquiry. That is, their inquiries might 
trigger anti-establishment concerns. Thus, the Court has said that “the 
First Amendment forbids civil courts from” interpreting “particular 
church doctrines” or opining on the “importance of those doctrines to 
the religion.”
53
 The Court’s understandable reticence to tell Hobby Lob-
by that it was wrong about its own beliefs, or that its beliefs were “flawed,” 
suggests exactly a reluctance to deal with issues that might entangle it in 
“religious and philosophical question[s]”
54
 or draw it “into impermissible 
questions of theology.”
55
 To like effect is the Establishment-Clause leg of 
the ruling in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
EEOC, where the Court held that the clause prohibits “government in-
volvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”
56
 For a court to declare what is 
and is not important in the religious life of a claimant risks this type of 
inappropriate establishmentarian “involvement.” Once again, the effect is 
said to be to separate the civil and religious realms, mitigating the risk of 
political polarization if courts were more deeply involved in making 
judgments about burdens on religious exercise. 
Both arguments at least indirectly address and aim to deflect the ob-
jection that religious accommodation is one of the spoils of political in-
fluence. The first does so by separating religious and civil concerns as a 
matter of expertise and competence. The second does so by preventing 
courts from making the sorts of judgments about religion that might be 
perceived as non-neutral and a violation of the Establishment Clause. In 
the following sections, this Essay explores these two arguments and ques-
tions whether they are successful in dissociating religious accommoda-
tion and political polarization. 
II. THE ARGUMENT FROM INSTITUTIONAL INCOMPETENCE 
The argument from institutional incompetence supposes that civil 
decision makers are poor arbiters when it comes to religion. Drawing in 
part from John Locke’s views, the claim is that the arguments and tools 
available to the civil authority (force, in particular) are ineffectual means 
of evaluation and suasion when it comes to religion.
57
 James Madison’s 
 
53
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 
393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969). 
54
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014). 
55
Helfand, supra note 52, at 22. 
56
565 U.S. 171, 188–89 (2012). 
57
See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 162 (Wilson, Spence & 
Mawman eds., 1788) (1689). 
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position was to like effect: civil authorities are incompetent judges when 
it comes to religious truth.
58
 The spheres of religious and civil authority 
are distinct. Advocates of this type of institutional separation are skeptical 
that religious knowledge is available to the civil authority and vice versa. 
Yet when one considers some of Madison’s own reasons for civil in-
competence as to religion, the claim of civil incompetence appears in a 
more complicated and qualified light. To support his view that the 
spheres of religious and civil authority are distinct, Madison relies heavily 
on the example of Christianity. To say that an establishment is necessary 
to support Christianity: 
[I]s a contradiction to the Christian Religion itself, for every page 
of it disavows a dependence on the powers of this world: it is a con-
tradiction to fact; for it is known that this Religion both existed and 
flourished, not only without the support of human laws, but in spite 
of every opposition from them, and not only during the period of 
miraculous aid, but long after it had been left to its own evidence 
and the ordinary care of Providence. Nay, it is a contradiction in 
terms; for a Religion not invented by human policy, must have pre-
existed and been supported, before it was established by human 
policy. It is moreover to weaken in those who profess this Religion a 
pious confidence in its innate excellence and the patronage of its 
Author; and to foster in those who still reject it, a suspicion that its 
friends are too conscious of its fallacies to trust it to its own merits.
59
 
Underlying Madison’s argument of civil incompetence to evaluate reli-
gion are several assumptions about the nature of religion, which Madison 
extrapolates from Christianity’s history (or at least the Christian history 
he offers). First, the reason for the civil authority’s incompetence as to 
religion is that religion is an ancient phenomenon with an extremely 
long history—one comprising many “pages” that predates the civil au-
thority and that has survived over time in spite of it.
60
 Indeed, one might 
say that Christianity has proved itself to be its own establishment, its own 
independent institution that has developed over time and under the 
tending of generations of practicing Christians, which therefore cannot 
be co-opted by the state. Christianity’s doctrines, its tradition “left to its 
own evidence,” developed and flourished over many years during which 
its durability was perpetually tested by the civil authority. It is for this rea-
son that it would be perverse, “a contradiction in terms[,]” to believe that 
civil institutions could have anything decisive to say about the institution 
of Christianity, and by extension of the institution of religion.
61
 
 
58
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments (1785), reprinted in James Madison: Writings 29, 32 (Jack N. Rakove 
ed., 1999). 
59
Id. 
60
Id.  
61
Id.  
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Second, civil intermeddling with religion might “weaken” the “pious 
confidence” of the community or group of people committed to it and 
strengthen the suspicion of its skeptics.
62
 Again, the institutional, com-
munal quality of Madison’s argument is critical: the civil authority’s estab-
lishment of religion might threaten or subvert the institutional compe-
tence of the community of the truly devout.
63
 The assumption is that there 
is such an institutional community—with its own authority, competency, 
history, and collection of beliefs and practices—which has sustained 
Christianity, which exists alongside but independent from the civil au-
thority, and whose intelligibly distinctive competency could be injured by 
the intrusion of the state. To be sure, Madison also refers several times in 
the Memorial and Remonstrance to the “conscience of every man” as invio-
lable.
64
 But here, when he specifically considers the matter of institutional 
competence, Madison’s argument is addressed to the preservation of the 
distinct institution and tradition of religious authority. 
Madison’s key insight in this portion of the Memorial and Remon-
strance is that arguments about the institutional incompetence of the civil 
authority and related claims of institutional deference by judges assume 
the existence of other institutions in civil society that are competent as to 
the matter at issue. In a recent essay, Professor Phillip Muñoz suggests 
that what the founding generation meant by “religion” was fairly tightly 
restricted to matters of communal “worship,” and he cites to Madison’s 
own official presidential proclamation calling for a day of “public humili-
ation and prayer”: 
If the public homage of a people can ever be worthy [of] the favor-
able regard of the Holy and Omniscient Being to whom it is ad-
dressed, it must be that, in which those who join in it are guided on-
ly by their free choice, by the impulse of their hearts and the 
dictates of their consciences . . . .
65
 
What is of interest in this passage is not that religious belief must be free 
and “uncoerced” (as he later puts it), though that is certainly important. 
It is instead the assumption that communal “worship” is a distinctive sub-
stantive element of the category “religion” and that “worship” is engaged 
in by a group of believers (the “public homage of a people”) affirming 
 
62
Id.  
63
See Kathleen A. Brady, The Distinctiveness of Religion in American Law: 
Rethinking Religion Clause Jurisprudence 124 (2015) (“Government involvement 
in religious matters also harms the institutions whose role it is to help identify and 
teach this truth and to nurture faith.”). 
64
Madison, supra note 58, at 30. 
65
Vincent Phillip Muñoz, Two Concepts of Religious Liberty: The Natural Rights and 
Moral Autonomy Approaches to the Free Exercise of Religion, 110 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 369, 
370–71 (2016) (quoting James Madison, Proclamation on Day of Public Humiliation 
and Prayer (July 23, 1813), http://millercenter.org/president/madison/speeches/ 
speech-3622). 
20_4_DeGirolami_Article_2 (Do Not Delete) 1/23/2017  1:47 PM 
1142 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:4 
the same set of beliefs. It is the group-like, communal, institutional quali-
ty of religion assumed by Madison to define religion and to justify the 
state’s non-intrusion. 
Indeed, judicial deference in other contexts frequently depends up-
on evaluations of the comparative expertise of other institutions of civil 
society. As Professor Paul Horwitz has observed, “courts defer to other in-
stitutions when they believe that those institutions know more than the 
courts do about some set of issues, such that it makes sense to allow the 
views of the knowledgeable authority to substitute for the courts’ own 
judgment.”
66
 As comparative advantages in institutional knowledge or 
expertise diminish, so does the justification for epistemic deference by 
courts. 
While Horwitz lists several public institutions—administrative agen-
cies, the military, prisons, and public universities
67
—to which courts regu-
larly defer, deference to private institutions and associations may be epis-
temically warranted as well. Consider in this respect an example that may 
seem far afield but is in some ways analogous: the business judgment 
rule.
68
 Courts presume that “in making a business decision the directors 
of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the com-
pany.”
69
 As Judge Winter once explained, while: 
[A]n automobile driver who makes a mistake in judgment as to 
speed or distance injuring a pedestrian will likely be called upon 
to respond in damages, a corporate officer who makes a mistake 
in judgment as to economic conditions, consumer tastes or pro-
duction line efficiency will rarely, if ever, be found liable for 
damages suffered by the corporation.
70
 
One crucial reason is that courts and businesses operate in different 
domains—different spheres of expertise—so that “after-the-fact litigation 
is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions.”
71
 
The rule prescribes “abstention” on the part of courts because they lack 
 
66
Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1061, 1085 (2008). 
67
Id. at 1087–89. 
68
Whether contractual relationships such as businesses are subsets of private 
associations or the other way round is debatable. See, e.g., Marc O. DeGirolami, 
Classical Liberalism: Teaching Its Own Undoing, Libr. L. & Liberty (Jan. 6, 2016), 
http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/classical-liberalism-teaching-its-own-
undoing/; Richard Epstein, Freedom of Association and Antidiscrimination Law: An 
Imperfect Reconciliation, Libr. L. & Liberty (Jan. 2, 2016), http://www. 
libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/freedom-of-association-and-antidiscrimination-law-
an-imperfect-reconciliation/. 
69
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
70
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982). 
71
Id. at 886. 
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the expertise to assess business decisions.
72
 Yet this deference has limits: 
where the decision lacks a business purpose or where it is not made in 
“good faith” and with “honest belief” in its soundness, and certainly when 
it is fraudulent, the presumption may be overcome.
73
 
There are several common assumptions when courts defer to reli-
gious claimants who seek accommodations: just as courts acquiesce in 
“good faith” decisions by the directors of corporations, so too, do they 
defer to “sincere” religious claimants, because in both cases courts are 
not in an epistemically advantageous position to evaluate the judgment 
of the private institution. They are likely in both cases to lack the requi-
site competencies. Indeed, one might well rename the parallel set of pre-
sumptions pressed by Madison and many others the “religious judgment 
rule.” 
Yet just as the business judgment rule assumes the existence of estab-
lished institutions with comparative advantages in expertise when it 
comes to making business decisions, the religious judgment rule also de-
pends upon a similar assumption. Epistemic deference, in either context, 
would not otherwise be warranted. Without any baseline understanding 
of what constitutes “religious judgments” and which institutions are com-
petent to make them, the presumption of deference is greatly destabi-
lized. For courts are just as competent to detect and evaluate fraud, bad 
faith, dishonesty, delusion, and frivolousness in the business context as in 
the religious context. 
True, as to religion, the issue is complicated by larger disagreements 
about the primacy of institutional or individual religious freedom in 
American law. If the individual, or the individual conscience, is the locus 
of religious authority, then he or she (or it) is the “institution” to which 
courts must defer. Some recent scholarship contends that group, corpo-
rate, or truly institutional religious freedom is the primary right (or at 
least a co-equal right with individual religious freedom), while other 
scholars resist this view.
74
 Some argue that individual religious freedom is 
 
72
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
Vand. L. Rev. 83, 119 (2004). 
73
Id. at 100; see also D. Gordon Smith, The Modern Business Judgment Rule (BYU 
Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 15-09, 2015). 
74
See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, First Amendment Institutions 82 (2013); Steven 
D. Smith, The Rise and Decline of American Religious Freedom 37 (2014); 
Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) an Exposition, Translation, 
and Defense, 21 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 33, 46 (2013); Douglas Laycock, The 
Campaign Against Religious Liberty, in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty 231, 
231 (Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016); Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, 
Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 Va. L. Rev. 917, 919 (2013). 
20_4_DeGirolami_Article_2 (Do Not Delete) 1/23/2017  1:47 PM 
1144 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:4 
derivative of or parasitic on institutional religious freedom while others 
argue for the reverse.
75
 
While it is not necessary to resolve this debate conclusively, it is help-
ful to see the argument from epistemic deference on a continuum. Epis-
temic deference becomes more and more sensible where courts are con-
fronted by claims of religious burdens that are part of a larger set of 
interconnected beliefs and practices. The comparative advantages in in-
stitutional knowledge increase for religion, and decrease for courts, as 
the religious tradition becomes more complex, intricate, group-like, and 
enduring. It stands to reason that, in the main, the more developed and 
mature the religious tradition—the more “pages” of history and experi-
ence it comprises and the more it has been sustained and cultivated over 
time by groups of believers
76
—the more compelling the justification for 
epistemic deference becomes. Conversely, the institutional competence 
of courts increases as the institutional expertise of religion decreases. As 
the claim for accommodation becomes disconnected from a religious 
tradition—as it becomes deracinated from any larger body of durable be-
liefs and practices within which it is integrated and handed down inter-
generationally—there is less and less specifically religious institutional 
knowledge to which courts must defer. 
Precisely the contrary assumption underlies the hyper-deference ac-
corded to individual beliefs and practices under the prevailing doctrine. 
The individual believer’s sincerity about what he believes is often suffi-
cient to satisfy the standard, even when (perhaps even especially when) 
his beliefs and practices run contrary to the institution or religious tradi-
tion of which he claims to be a member. Religion thus becomes synony-
mous with autonomous conviction. Yet that approach has undermined 
the very argument for deference that it was meant to justify: that courts 
are incompetent institutions to make judgments about religion. And it 
has also deprived the legal category of “religion” of everything except the 
name—a name that the shrewd claimant is well advised to attach to what-
ever autonomous conviction he happens to hold. 
III. THE ARGUMENT FROM EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT 
What of the second justification for rigorous deference on the ques-
tion of religious burden—the danger of excessive entanglement between 
the civil and religious authority? Against my suggestion that religious tra-
ditions and groups suffer under the current regime, I can report that 
 
75
Compare Smith, supra note 74, at 37, with Ashutosh Bhagwat, Religious 
Associations: Hosanna-Tabor and the Instrumental Value of Religious Groups, 92 Wash. U. 
L. Rev. 73, 93–94 (2014), and Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The 
Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1965, 1987 (2007). 
76
Madison, supra note 58, at 33. 
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most reactions emphasize the individuality of religious belief: what of the 
solitary claimant who seeks a draft exemption because he believes that 
God or moral “goodness” forbids him from killing people?
77
 Or the lone 
seeker who cannot point to any existing system of religious belief for her 
sincere view that abiding by a zoning ordinance disrupts her spiritual 
“inner flow”?
78
 Unlike the argument from institutional incompetence, 
concerns about excessive state entanglement in religion are motivated by 
the view that it is inappropriate or wrong for the state to control religion 
or to steer it in any particular direction. The state must be neutral as to 
religion,
79
 and courts must not improperly favor or promote organized 
religious traditions with comparatively stable and long histories while dis-
favoring new or emerging religious phenomena. Psychic Sophie
80
 or 
Robert Bellah’s Sheila,
81
 who follow their “own little voice[,]”
82
 are at least 
as much religions as Roman Catholicism or Judaism. 
Indeed, perhaps they are even more so. I am skeptical about how 
“neutrality” is deployed in this set of reactions. It is telling that in the 
minds of many of my interlocutors, religion is immediately associated 
with the ineffably subjective, inarticulable experiences, desires, and per-
sonal commitments of individual claimants. That perception of reli-
gion—as a changeable set of fragmented and idiosyncratic views mirror-
ing the self’s then-existing needs—is also reflected in the single-most 
rapidly growing religious constituency in the United States (particularly 
among millennials), the unaffiliated “Nones.”
83
 The Nones hold a broad 
range of convictions, but the abiding dislike of institutional religion and 
the lack of importance
84
 they attach to religion are constants. In a fairly 
recent survey of the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, a quarter of 
the Nones reported they believe in astrology; a quarter of them believe in 
reincarnation; 30% of them say they believe in the spiritual energy of 
crystals, trees, or mountains.
85
 But few take any of these views seriously or 
 
77
See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 186 (1965) (noting with 
approval that the court of appeals “found little distinction between Jakobson’s 
devotion to a mystical force of ‘Godness’ and Seeger’s compulsion to ‘goodness’”).  
78
See Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 571 (4th Cir. 2013). 
79
See generally Andrew Koppelman, Defending American Religious 
Neutrality (2013). 
80
Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 564. The Fourth Circuit held that Psychic Sophie’s 
beliefs did not constitute a religion, though there are reasons to wonder why. Id. at 
571. For discussion, see Movsesian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 3–5). 
81
Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and 
Commitment in American Life 221 (1985). 
82
Id. 
83
See Movsesian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 1); see also Pew Research Ctr., 
“Nones” on the Rise: One-in-Five Adults Have No Religious Affiliation (2012), 
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/10/NonesOnTheRise-full.pdf. 
84
Pew Research Ctr., supra note 83, at 24–25. 
85
Id. at 24. 
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attach much importance to them; in fact, this is one of the few attributes 
that binds them together as a group.
86
 To be religious in this conception 
is to invent and reinvent one’s own spirituality at need, often in ways that 
celebrate and reaffirm the ego.
87
 It is to be “spiritual, but not religious”
88
 
because of discomfort with any God other than the God within, “the di-
vinity that resides inside your very self and soul.”
89
 It is to satisfy the 
changeable yearnings and longings of the individual spirit.
90
 
This type of individualistic and subjective understanding of religion 
is not new in America; nineteenth century Transcendentalism is one 
forebear, and there are probably several others. But, as my colleague, 
Mark Movsesian, writes: 
Unlike earlier idiosyncratic believers, today’s Nones cannot be dis-
missed as “a small group of ‘kooks’ who just don’t fit into respecta-
ble American society.” Nones comprise perhaps one-fifth of the 
adult population and are perhaps the third largest religious group 
in the country. To quote Charles Taylor, the “ethic of authenticity” 
and “expressive individualism” that fascinated Romantic elites like 
the Transcendentalists has gone mainstream.
91
 
The growing solipsism, “do-it-yourself”-ism, and consumer-oriented spir-
ituality
92
 of American religion is transforming the American religious 
landscape profoundly as traditional religious orthodoxies of various kinds 
that do not conform to the Nones’ model are increasingly rejected as ab-
errant and extreme.
93
 
 
86
See Religious Landscape Study: Importance of Religion in One’s Life, Pew Research 
Ctr., http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/importance-of-religion-in-
ones-life/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (reporting that 66% of Nones say that religion is 
“not at all important” or “not too important” in their lives, while only 13% say that it 
is “very important”). 
87
See Robert C. Fuller, Spiritual, but Not Religious: Understanding 
Unchurched America 5 (2001). 
88
Id. 
89
Douthat, supra note 12, at 216. 
90
See, e.g., Kathryn Lofton, Oprah: The Gospel of an Icon 209 (2011); 
Corinna Nicolaou, A None’s Story: Searching for Meaning Inside 
Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, & Islam at XII–XIII (2016) (describing the 
author’s exploration of these religions as “a personal quest to acquaint [herself] with 
religion”). 
91
Movsesian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 8) (footnotes and citations omitted) 
(quoting Fuller, supra note 87, at 154). 
92
Douthat, supra note 12, at 62. 
93
A fairly recent study by the Barna Research Group finds that 50–79% of 
respondents believe that the following are examples of “very” or “somewhat” 
“extreme” religion: “[d]emonstrat[ing] outside an organization they consider 
immoral”; “[p]reach[ing] a religious message in a public place”; “[a]ttempt[ing] to 
convert others to their faith”; and “[p]ray[ing] out loud in public for a stranger,” 
among others. See Five Ways Christianity Is Increasingly Viewed as Extremist, Barna Grp. 
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Law has played its part as well, modest though it may be. It has both 
reflected and reaffirmed these larger cultural trends. The predominant 
conception of religion in American law bears a close resemblance to the 
consumerist model of religion described by sociologist Grace Davie as the 
“marketplace” approach.
94
 Religious groups splinter and diversify—the 
better to suit the felt desires of existing and prospective adherents. They 
compete with one another as service providers or private firms would, 
with the consumer selecting the religion that best corresponds to his pre-
sent circumstances. The consumer changes his associational affiliations 
accordingly.
95
 What is “true” in this model is, as William James once had 
it, what most closely accords with “genuine happiness”: “If a creed makes 
a man feel happy, he almost inevitably adopts it. Such a belief ought to 
be true; therefore it is true . . . .”
96
 The Jamesian view of religion and its 
relationship to truth has had a powerful influence on the Supreme 
Court; indeed, it has been explicitly cited by at least one Supreme Court 
justice for the proposition that a jury cannot distinguish sincerity of reli-
gious belief from religious truth.
97
 Religious freedom thus assumes a 
highly voluntarist character.
98
 The untrammeled freedom of individual 
choice-making and choice-changing is the primary object of legal protec-
tion because what is “true” depends not on the achievement and reten-
tion of a superior religious insight (an insight that the government 
would, in any case, be prevented from embracing by the Establishment 
Clause) but on the process of choice-making and changing in response 
to ever-altering circumstances and desires. 
The law of religious accommodation incorporates many of these as-
sumptions. Concerns that the free-exercise balancing test authorized a 
kind of over-pluralized, autonomized anarchy motivated the Court to 
change course in Employment Division v. Smith, where it returned to the 
pre-Sherbert exemption regime.
99
 But the passage of RFRA (unanimous in 
the House—a more lopsided vote than the Declaration of War following 
 
(Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.barna.com/research/five-ways-christianity-is-increasingly-
viewed-as-extremist/. 
94
Grace Davie, The Sociology of Religion 73 (2007). 
95
Id. at 12. 
96
James, supra note 8, at 78–79. 
97
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92–93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“I 
do not see how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations as 
to what is believable. The most convincing proof that one believes his statements is to 
show that they have been true in his experience.”). 
98
Some of the most eloquent defenses of religious freedom in the United States 
begin from explicitly voluntarist premises. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religious Displays 
and the Voluntary Approach to Church and State, 63 Okla. L. Rev. 47, 48 (2010); Douglas 
Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 51, 65 (2007); Christopher 
C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAS, S.D. L. Rev. 466, 467 
(2010). 
99
494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
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Pearl Harbor received) and RLUIPA, together with sundry state versions 
of RFRA, restored the autonomized approach as the primary test against 
which religious exemption claims are evaluated. As already noted, these 
laws generally instruct courts to avoid inquiries into the centrality of a be-
lief; indeed, Smith itself said so.
100
 Subjective perceptions of burdens may 
not be questioned because religious exercise is primarily understood as a 
matter of autonomous, individual choice—a choice that must be hon-
ored because it is personally “fulfilling”
101
 and that marks off one’s dis-
tinctive human “identity.”
102
 
This is hardly a neutral approach to religion. It is one that fosters a 
very particular conception of religion, one that a critic might perceive as 
debased, ephemeral, shallow, and unserious. Yet however perceived, if 
the objection to judicial evaluations of religious burden in accommoda-
tion cases is that courts would thereby be excessively entangling the state 
and religion, it seems to neglect that courts and the state are already en-
tangled neck-deep in religion. The tests for religious accommodation—
including the conventional gloss on the substantial burden inquiry—
champion and systematically promote a specific and highly contestable 
understanding of religion, one that happens, perhaps not coincidentally, 
to align neatly with the premises of some of the most culturally powerful 
religious trends in America. 
For years, prominent scholars have made arguments trading on the 
Madisonian idea that establishment corrupts religion and that long-
standing civic traditions such as legislative prayer render religion an un-
serious affair.
103
 But these are not the only possible state-promoted cor-
rupting and unserious influences on religion. Professor Mark Tushnet 
has recently argued that accommodationist decisions like Hobby Lobby 
“lower the cost of faith.”
104
 They weaken religion because they cheapen 
belief.
105
 It is rather late in the day, however, for such complaints. If the 
American law of religious accommodation has promoted unserious reli-
gion, the root of the problem runs deeper than a decision issued three 
 
100
Id. at 886–87; Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012).  
101
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
102
See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1853 (2014) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (“A person’s response to the doctrine, language, and imagery contained 
in those invocations reveals a core aspect of identity—who that person is and how she 
faces the world.”).  
103
See, e.g., Perry Dane, Prayer Is Serious Business: Reflections on Town of Greece, 15 
Rutgers J.L. & Religion 611, 616–17, 616 n.2 (2014); Andrew Koppelman, 
Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1831, 1873–
74 (2009). 
104
See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 34, at 26; see also Mark Tushnet, In Praise of 
Martyrdom, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 1117, 1119 (1999). 
105
Tushnet, supra note 34, at 26. 
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years ago. It is implicated in the very conception of religion that Ameri-
can law has steadfastly championed over decades. 
IV. ACCOMMODATION SKEPTICISM AND  
POLITICAL POLARIZATION 
In recent years, skepticism about religious accommodation from 
those who are either indifferent or hostile to religion has become an al-
together banal staple of the academic literature.
106
 That skepticism has 
been spurred on by the sense that religious accommodation challenges 
what Tushnet has described as the “equality agenda.”
107
 It is manifest in 
the effluvium of accommodation-critical commentary motivated by per-
ceived threats to sundry interests in sexual liberty and equality of increas-
ingly recondite varieties.
108
 And it is closely connected to another growing 
cache of scholarship that questions whether religion as a category merits 
any special legal treatment at all.
109
 
Yet skepticism about religious accommodation is also coming from 
less expected quarters—from those who are sympathetic to religion or 
perhaps even religious believers themselves.
110
 This literature has attract-
ed almost no notice. The standard view continues to be that those who 
are sympathetic to religion are always disposed favorably toward accom-
modation.
111
 While that has largely been true over the last few decades,
112
 
it may be changing. And the changes are in part attributable to the polit-
ical polarization resulting from the accommodation strategy. 
In a recent essay, for example, Professor Maimon Schwarzschild 
plausibly suggests that one of the principal effects of the accommodation 
strategy over the last century has been to balkanize religion—to fragment 
it into ever-smaller constituencies.
113
 When religious accommodations 
were first constitutionalized, their effect was to incentivize the creation of 
sects, since it was such sects, and not more established religious institu-
tions and traditions, that would be in a political position to need court-
 
106
Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise by Moonlight, 53 San Diego L. Rev. 105, 108 
(2016).  
107
Tushnet, supra note 34, at 19. 
108
For citation to and discussion of this literature, see DeGirolami, supra note 
106, at 108, and Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 154, 159–
60 (2014). 
109
See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 74, at 232; Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 
Const. Comment. 1, 25 (2008). 
110
Maimon Schwarzschild, Do Religious Exemptions Save?, 53 San Diego L. Rev. 
185, 187 (2016). 
111
Id. at 185. 
112
For some of the early standard bearers, see, for example, Douglas Laycock, 
The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 4; Michael W. McConnell, 
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 3 (1985). 
113
Schwarzschild, supra note 110, at 194. 
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sanctioned accommodation.
114
 Constitutionalized religious accommoda-
tion was, moreover, a kind of ersatz legal compensation for the ex-
pungement of traditional institutional religion from civic life advocated 
by legal scholars with secular commitments and steadily mandated by the 
Supreme Court in the twentieth century.
115
 Just at the moment when the 
Court was disallowing religious symbols and exercises in the public 
square (in public schools and on civil property, for example), it also be-
gan to offer religious accommodations as a matter of constitutional right 
and subsequently legislative grace.
116
 
“Yet the tradeoff[,]” writes Schwarzschild, “of religious interests lost 
and gained is not really symmetrical or balanced.”
117
 Its effect was to pun-
ish established religious traditions such as Mainline Protestantism and to 
promote, at first, religions including Seventh-Day Adventism and the 
Amish, which, though far from the Mainline, had distinctive histories of 
their own.
118
 Yet with time, and particularly after the fall of the federal 
RFRA and the rise of RLUIPA, which specifically protects religion in 
prison, the promotion of religious balkanization and sectification 
through the accommodation strategy increased dramatically.
119
 Of 
course, the prison population is not a representative cross-section of 
American society. And, naturally, there are many other causes for the de-
cline of Mainline Protestantism and other established religious traditions 
in America.
120
 
Nevertheless, law has contributed to these developments. The fact 
that federal law categorically elevates prisoners as special subjects of reli-
gious accommodation is suggestive of larger trends and makes a powerful 
symbolic statement.
121
 When the law: 
[S]eems to offer exemptions and accommodation to any sect or 
cult that seeks it and that claims to be a religion[,] [it] must tend at 
least to some degree to legitimate such sectarianism in the public 
 
114
Id. 
115
Id. at 194–95. 
116
Id. 
117
Id. at 195. 
118
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398, 399, 399 n.1 (1963). 
119
US Comm’n on Civil Rights, Enforcing Religious Freedom in Prison 87 
(2008) (indicating that of the 250 RLUIPA claims filed in federal courts from 2001 
through 2006, more than half were brought by claimants designated as “Pagans,” 
“Unknown/Unspecified,” “Native Americans,” and “Muslims”). 
120
On some of these causes, see Joseph Bottum, An Anxious Age: The Post-
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of America 104–05 (2013). 
121
Already the Supreme Court’s favorable decision for the prisoner in Holt v. 
Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015), has induced lower court judges to apply more 
rigorous standards to prisoner RLUIPA claims. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Wheeler, No. 
5:15-CV-130, 2016 WL 1117448, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 22, 2016). 
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eye and to erode the distinction between faiths with substantial his-
tory—and with the intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic resources 
that grow with historic development—and sects and cults without 
such resources.
122
 
The hyper-deferential approach to the question of substantial burden on 
religious exercise is part of the self-same legacy. It, too, has contributed 
to the weakening of organized, traditional religion and to its reduced 
and increasingly supplicant position toward the state. These effects are 
exacerbated when set alongside an aggressive interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause that increasingly forbids the civil authority from any 
symbolic contact or connection with those religious institutions that have 
been historically and culturally central in the American political experi-
ence, Christianity most prominent among them. All of this is not neutral 
in the least as to religion, unless “neutrality” is understood as the promo-
tion of certain conceptions of religion and the demotion of others. 
Another new line of accommodation skepticism cautions that too 
single-minded a focus on religious accommodation can divert a religious 
community’s attention away from the difficult work of internal fortifica-
tion and external social and political transformation, and toward the 
more defensive work of carving out space for individual belief and prac-
tice sheltered from the reach of the civil authority.
123
 There are both po-
tential inward and outward dangers here. 
The inward danger is that in the process of seeking accommoda-
tions, religious communities may adopt the locutions and distinctive ar-
got of the law in thinking about the nature of their own religious tradi-
tions and commitments. And they may be corrupted by it. Yuval Levin, 
for example, argues that: 
As a practical matter these days, religious liberty is essential not so 
much because it protects people’s ability to believe and say certain 
things but because it protects people’s ability to live in a certain 
way. That way of living—shaped by memory, bounded by tradition, 
directed to the future, formed to meet obligations both sacred and 
profane, and ultimately answerable to permanent truths—cannot 
be embodied in the practice of lone individuals, because at its es-
sence it is about relational commitments . . . . This understanding of 
the practical meaning of our first freedom makes it easier to see 
why the practice it protects so easily outgrows the narrow bounds of 
the exercise of religion as envisioned by our legal system.
124
 
The primary risk of religious accommodation, Levin argues, is that the 
struggle for exemptions from civil authority for the freedom to espouse 
religious commitments might be so intense, hard-fought, and all-
 
122
Schwarzschild, supra note 110, at 198. 
123
Yuval Levin, The Perils of Religious Liberty, First Things, Feb. 2016, at 29, 35.  
124
Id. at 34. 
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consuming as eventually to be mistaken by those inside the religious 
community for the religious commitments themselves.
125
 The damage will 
be especially severe for exactly those religious groups whose commit-
ments are informed and “bounded by tradition.” 
The corresponding outward danger of pursuing the accommodation 
strategy is that it will deflect energy and resources from the vital enter-
prise of resisting the growth and expanding power of government.
126
 In-
deed, an exclusive focus on seeking and obtaining accommodations may 
ultimately obscure the reason for the increasing need for those very ac-
commodations: the progressive intrusion of the government into areas of 
civil life that it had never before touched.
127
 As the government assumes 
an increasingly large role in the life of the citizenry, the territory over 
which religion and the state conflict can only increase. The pursuit of re-
ligious accommodation concedes that territory. It gives it up for lost. And 
the religious communities likely to suffer most through the accommoda-
tion strategy are those that have stood longest and hardiest as institution-
al competitors to the state’s own authority—and, indeed, that historically 
have posed the most substantial challenges to the growth of state pow-
er.
128
 Religion that is unserious, fragmented, feckless, self-absorbed, and 
ephemeral is more likely to be accommodated, precisely because it does 
not threaten prevailing political and cultural orthodoxies. Religion that is 
serious, integrated, historically stable, enduring, and that presents a sys-
tem of moral commitments in direct competition with those espoused by 
the state is more likely not to be accommodated, precisely because it does 
threaten prevailing political and cultural orthodoxies. 
Religious accommodation may be, moreover, an unsustainable strat-
egy in the long run: “In an ever-more-minutely regulated polity, you cannot 
keep demanding exemptions; and they will not be granted . . . . Religious 
 
125
Id. at 35. 
126
For discussion, see DeGirolami, supra note 106, at 118. 
127
See Laycock, supra note 74, at 232 (“Never before in our history had we 
attempted to require people to violate a core religious teaching of our largest 
religions.”). 
128
The locus classicus for the importance of religious institutions and the 
associations of civil society more broadly as vital competitors to the state and as a 
safeguard against tyranny is 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 310–
11 (Henry Reeve trans., The Colonial Press rev. ed. 1900) (1835) (“Religion in 
America takes no direct part in the government of society, but it must nevertheless be 
regarded as the foremost of the political institutions of that country; for if it does not 
impart a taste for freedom, it facilitates the use of free institutions . . . . I do not know 
whether all the Americans have a sincere faith in their religion, for who can search 
the human heart? But I am certain that they hold it to be indispensable to the 
maintenance of republican institutions . . . . The Americans combine the notions of 
Christianity and of liberty so intimately in their minds, that it is impossible to make 
them conceive the one without the other . . . .”). 
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Americans need not retreat from robust political action, merely to plead for 
special indulgence. It will not avail them, or not for long, if they do.”
129
 
Admittedly, the prospects of reducing the size of government do not 
seem particularly favorable. Perhaps the exemption strategy is all that 
remains to religious communities as the ambit of state authority expands, 
and the ways in which people may be negatively affected, or “harmed,” by 
a state-sanctioned religious accommodation likewise expand. Religious 
accommodations are now said, for example, to implicate injuries to the 
“dignity” of those who oppose them, the implication of which is that the 
state’s authority includes the power to confer human dignity as a self-
standing civic good. People want to be dignified by the state,
130
 their self-
worth to be accorded official validation, and they perceive accommoda-
tion meant for the protection of religious freedom as a state-sanctioned 
indignity demanding state remediation. Yet offenses to dignity are only 
the most extreme example of the overall expansion of government inter-
ests.
131
 These are not hopeful developments for the future of religious ac-
commodation. 
This may be an opportune moment to note that, in past work, I have 
supported religious accommodations.
132
 I continue to admire and respect 
the work of scholars and policy makers who pursue modus vivendi ar-
rangements that will foster the free exercise of religious communities 
and traditions within a larger secular polity that is increasingly dubious 
about established, institutional religion. But the claims of the new ac-
commodation skeptics are powerful, and I have begun to doubt that ac-
 
129
Schwartzchild, supra note 110, at 199–200; see also Steven D. Smith, The 
Tortuous Course of Religious Freedom, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1553, 1557 (2016)(“As 
government has expanded the scope of its ambitions and activities, and as legal 
requirements and regulations accordingly proliferate, the occasions of conflict 
between law and religion multiply.”). 
130
For acute analysis of the dignitarian turn in the gay rights context, see Noa 
Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 37 Harv. J.L. 
& Gender 243, 263 (2014) (“Windsor is a pivotal moment in the metamorphosis of 
the legal homosexual. The legal homosexual, at least in states where same-sex 
marriage is legally recognized, is portrayed as a morally dignified person.”). 
131
A well-argued, but similarly sweeping, expansion of the ambit of the state’s 
interests holds that the government can regulate expression that violates norms of 
“full and equal citizenship” and results in associated harm. See Nelson Tebbe, 
Government Nonendorsement, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 648, 650 (2013). As a corollary to his 
argument that the government is prohibited from endorsing any view that “abridges 
full and equal citizenship in a free society,” Professor Tebbe writes: “Translated into 
political morality, government nonendorsement would mean that the limits 
identified in this Article should function as the only restrictions on government’s 
power to endorse ideas. Within those limits, government should be free to favor or 
disfavor a wide range of views, even if they are comprehensive.” Id. at 650, 699–700. 
Needless to say, there are numerous religious doctrines and beliefs that are likely to 
violate a categorical norm of political liberalism of this type. 
132
See DeGirolami, supra note 45, at 147–88. 
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commodation is a viable long-term approach. The new skeptics are per-
suasive that the seeking of religious accommodation has damaged, and 
may further damage, those religious traditions that have stood longest 
and hardiest, steadily depriving them of vital sources of strength, and 
rendering them fragmented, ephemeral, and perhaps even ultimately 
unserious affairs. 
Might the answer then be to encourage courts to inquire more deep-
ly into the nature of the burden on religion when adjudicating accom-
modation cases? Unfortunately, that is extremely unlikely to cure what 
now ails religious accommodation. Indeed, it is a sign of just how polar-
ized the religious accommodation question has become that no tinkering 
with the applicable test is likely to help. 
Consider, for example, the recent and ongoing nonprofit litigation 
against the federal government’s contraception mandate. Under the ex-
isting, abjectly deferential standard for assessing the quality of the bur-
den, the vast majority of courts to address the issue found that the con-
traception mandate did not impose a substantial burden on the several 
nonprofits’ religious exercise.
133
 The question of the burden on the non-
profits, however, is not difficult when evaluated under a standard that 
would require the claimants to explain how their religious objection fits 
within an established religious tradition and system of belief and practice. 
They have explained, over and again, their view that a legally binding 
designation to provide contraceptive products and services implicates 
them in sinful behavior, the theological sources of their beliefs, and the 
importance of those beliefs within their own religious system and tradi-
tion of belief.
134
 The claimants may yet lose, but if they do it should not 
be because courts reject or refuse to defer to their explanation of the 
government’s interference with their religious exercise. 
Yet they did lose on that very issue, before nearly every court of ap-
peals to consider it and according to a standard that is said to be ex-
tremely deferential to their beliefs.
135
 That remarkable losing streak, 
when compared against the ostensible deference that courts purport to 
apply and generally have applied in most other contexts, strongly sug-
gests that the standard may be a secondary consideration altogether. 
Courts defer when the nature of the political and cultural challenge rep-
resented by the religious exemption is unthreatening—when they don’t 
take the religion seriously anyway. Accommodation, as I have said, is for 
unserious religion. When it is threatening, and the challenge is substan-
 
133
See HHS Information Central, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, http:// 
www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral#tab2 (last updated June 15, 2016) 
(collecting cases). The Supreme Court’s non-resolution of the burden issue is likely 
to result in future decisions by the lower courts against the claimants. 
134
See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 48, E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 
1557 (2016) (Nos. 14–1418, 14–1453, 14–1505, 15–35, 15–105, 15–119, 15–191), at *48. 
135
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 133. 
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tial, they do not defer. We accommodate when we don’t really care as a 
political or cultural matter, and we find reasons not to accommodate 
when we do. Perhaps this also suggests that political polarization is to 
some extent inevitable when some religious beliefs and exercises are ac-
commodated and some are not, and that, as in so many other contexts 
implicating the religion clauses, the aspiration to neutrality is a fantasy. 
An alternative possibility is that adopting a more stringent inquiry may be 
unwise and possibly counterproductive, since religious accommodation 
and religious liberty more broadly, particularly when it is felt to threaten 
or even to stand athwart vital gains in sexual liberty and equality, is at 
present so controversial.
136
 A tighter standard will not restore religion as a 
coherent legal category. It will more plausibly be used to defeat coherent 
religious claims of substantial burden. 
CONCLUSION 
The relationship of religious accommodation and political polariza-
tion is a perennial problem for any society that strives to balance interests 
in the rule of law and the toleration of religious groups. The prevailing 
strategy to balance those interests in twentieth century American law—
represented by the compelling interest test and its substantial burden re-
quirement, created in the 1960s as constitutional doctrine and reintro-
duced by statute in the 1990s—has been thought successful because of 
two principal features: (1) its solicitude for a conception of religion that 
is highly individualistic, claimant-centric, and anti-institutional; and (2) 
its simultaneous pretensions to neutrality as to religious questions. 
Yet there has always been, to put it mildly, a tension between these 
components of the religious accommodation strategy, as well as the asso-
ciated potential for religious accommodation to become more politically 
polarized than ever. The accommodation strategy, in tandem with an ex-
tremely aggressive interpretation of the Establishment Clause’s coverage, 
has had the effect of valuing religion that is weak and unthreatening to 
prevailing political and cultural mores, and disvaluing powerful, orga-
nized, and institutionally stable religion that offers substantial moral and 
cultural challenges to the existing politico-cultural mores. Religious ac-
commodation has been a needed, and welcome, approach to the prob-
lem of religious pluralism in America. But it has come with serious 
costs—costs that have been borne over decades primarily by established 
and longstanding religious traditions. Those costs show no signs of de-
creasing; to the contrary, they are likely to increase, and to result in fur-
ther damage to religious accommodation, and to religious freedom more 
broadly, in the years to come. 
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DeGirolami, supra note 106, at 108. 
